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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Maero's Brief occupies only about a page of argument defending the trial court's 
ruling that Westland II ceased to exist upon dissolution. The rationale advanced is that 
the express provisions of the partnership agreement control when the partnership is 
terminated, not the Uniform Partnership Act ("UPA"). No relevant authority is cited in 
support. No attempt is made to square this new theory with the plain language of the 
statute, or the Arndt case, or partnership law throughout the country that holds otherwise. 
No attempt is made to deal with the fact that the partnership agreement itself provides for 
a "liquidation" period after dissolution. 
Maero does not cite a single relevant authority in support of the theories, mostly 
new, that occupy the remainder of Appellee's Brief, which are without merit as follows: 
1. Maero's claim that the appeal should be dismissed because federal courts have 
exclusive jurisdiction of this action is without legal foundation because the claims of 
appellants are not a collateral attack on any order of the Larsen bankruptcy court, and 
federal law expressly grants concurrent state and federal jurisdiction of civil proceedings 
"related to" a bankruptcy case. This case could thus have been commenced in either 
federal bankruptcy court or state court, and now that the Larsen bankruptcy case has 
ended, there is no basis for federal jurisdiction of this case at all. 
2. The new claim that this appeal is moot under 11 U.S.C. §363(m) is spurious 
because this case is not an appeal of the bankruptcy court's order approving a sale of the 
Larsen interest. 
1 
3. The new claim that the right of first refusal provisions of the partnership 
agreement were abrogated by Westland IPs dissolution even if the partnership continued 
in existence during winding up is spurious because the rationale advanced has no 
foundation in law. 
4. The new claim that the trustee was not bound by the right of first refusal 
provisions because there was no legitimate general partner fails because there was no 
general partner vacancy as a matter of uncontested fact, and the idea that the right of first 
refusal provisions became ineffective merely because of a general partner vacancy is 
without foundation in law. 
5. The claim that the trustee was not bound by the right of first refusal provisions 
because she was not a substitute limited partner is spurious because the trustee was not a 
"purchaser" of the Larsen interest under paragraph 18—the bankruptcy estate was vested 
with the interest by operation of law, and under bankruptcy law not contested by Maero, 
the trustee was bound by the contract provisions because Larsen would have been bound 
by them if there had been no bankruptcy, since the trustee had no greater rights in the 
property than Larsen. 
6. The claim that trustee substantially gave notice to Bunker required by 
paragraph 18 of the partnership agreement is spurious because the trustee's notice of 
auction was in no way notice required by the contract, for the reasons set forth in 
Appellant's Brief, Point II.B., to which Maero's brief gives no response. 
2 
ARGUMENT 
A. There does not appear to be any material disagreement regarding the 
facts, with three exceptions. Contrary to the rules, Maero has rendered a complete 
alternative version of the facts. Appellants do not perceive any material disagreement 
with Maero's facts, except with regard to the following paragraphs: 
In paragraph 20 (Appellee's Brief, p. 9) Maero states that "Bunker did not 
liquidate the assets of the limited partnership . . .; rather he took action to acquire real 
property for the partnership and continued to operate the partnership for more than 14 
years." This implies that Bunker was inappropriately buying new property inconsistent 
with winding up the partnership's business. The context Maero leaves out is that the land 
Bunker acquired was part of the parcels that the partners had been making payments on 
for years under a purchase contract that Granada had left in default. Bunker liquidated 
this land as soon as he was able to obtain a reasonable market price. It is proceeds from 
the sale of that land that is the focus of this action. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 8-9. 
In paragraphs 17 and 19 of Maero's facts, Maero makes a fuss about Bunker 
signing an amendment to the partnership agreement himself as attorney-in-fact for the 
limited partners, and states that Bunker was "unable to explain" how he did that. The 
record at the pages cited, to the contrary, particularly the transcript at p. 91, contain 
Bunker's clear explanation that the partnership agreement describes the powers of 
attorney that he relied on to sign such amendments. 
Paragraph 22 of Maero's facts fails to state fully that the address on the trustee's 
3 
mailing matrix for Bunker was transcribed incorrectly from the Proof of Claim filed by 
Bunker on behalf of Westland II, and the address for Westland II was the old address for 
Granada, which had been vacated shortly after Granada's bankruptcy years earlier. The 
trustee knew the correct address for Bunker and Westland II as described in Appellant's 
Brief, p. 28, footnote 39. 
B. It is extraordinary that on the central issues before this court in this 
appeal Maero's brief does not contain a single citation to a case where the holding of 
the case supports the point for which the case is cited. Many of the theories that 
Maero advances in Appellee's Brief are not supported by any authority whatever, but 
where cases are cited on the central issues, they do not stand for the proposition for which 
they are cited. 
C. Maero's entire response to appellants9 brief concerning the trial court's 
erroneous conclusion that Westland II ceased to exist upon dissolution is contained 
in two short paragraphs on pp. 21-22 and rests on the erroneous claim that it is the 
partnership agreement that controls when a partnership is terminated. Maero does 
not address the law of "winding up", or even the fact that the Westland II partnership 
agreement itself contains a liquidation provision. Maero cites, without quotation, 
Thomas v. Price, 718 F. Supp. 598, 605 (S.D. Tex. 1989), as standing for the proposition 
that the UPA is "a gap filler that governs only when a partnership agreement is silent on 
an issue," thus arguing that it is the partnership agreement, not U.C.A. Section 48-1-27, 
that governs when a partnership is terminated. This theory is of course wholly 
4 
inconsistent with the language of the code and the Arndt1 case, which Maero makes no 
attempt to distinguish. Maero concludes his argument with the added twist that even if 
the partnership agreement were silent, then the statute dealing with the cancellation of a 
limited partnership certificate somehow in an unexplained way becomes the controlling 
statute that trumps all other applicable law. 
Thomas v. Price has nothing to do with partnership dissolution and winding up. 
The issue in that case concerned an unusual question of whether a partner that had lost its 
management rights and its interest in profits and capital was still a partner for purposes of 
standing to bring suit. All that is being discussed is the relationship of partners between 
themselves and the partnership. The court, in adhering to the partnership agreement, was 
not making a sweeping statement of general partnership law, but was addressing this 
narrow issue as follows (footnotes omitted): 
In other words, what are the consequences to a partner and the 
partnership when that partner loses its interest in the profits 
and surplus and its management rights? These are issues of 
first impression in Texas Jurisprudence and their resolution 
turns upon the partnership agreement of the parties and the 
Texas Uniform Partnership Act. Only where the partnership 
agreement is silent "do the provisions of the Texas Uniform 
Partnership Act . . . come into play." 
Maero's defense of the trial court is thus both half-hearted and without foundation 
in partnership law. The trial court clearly erred and should be reversed. 
Arndt v. First Interstate Bank. 1999 UT 91, 991 P.2d 584 (1999) 
5 
D. Maero does not seek to have this case remanded for a new trial if the trial 
court is reversed, but instead asserts every conceivable spurious theory of why the 
partnership agreement should not be enforced, including some argued for the first 
time, and alternatively argues that this court lacks jurisdiction to declare the 
transfer to Maero invalid. We agree that the case should be concluded here and not 
remanded for a new trial. We address each of Maero's arguments in the order presented 
in Appellee's Brief. 
1. Maero's jurisdiction argument rests upon the false premise that 
appellants9 position is an attack on the bankruptcy court's order authorizing a sale 
of the Larsen interest and a claim of "exclusive" bankruptcy court jurisdiction 
under circumstances where there is now no federal jurisdiction at all. (This 
addresses Point II A. of Appellee's Brief). Maero seeks dismissal of this appeal pursuant 
to this new "exclusive jurisdiction" theory. The remedy would not be to dismiss the 
appeal, but to reverse the trial court and remand the case for dismissal for lack of 
jurisdiction. However appealing that would be, since it would leave Maero out of court, 
the theory is fundamentally erroneous. 
It should first be pointed out that Maero's brief is technically wrong to assert 
"bankruptcy court jurisdiction." Federal jurisdiction of bankruptcy cases is in the district 
courts. Bankruptcy courts do not have separate jurisdiction of any cases because 
Bankruptcy judges are not tenured Article III judges under the Constitution and therefore 
have only limited jurisdiction to handle cases and render decisions as delegated to them 
6 
by the district courts under standards set forth in the Bankruptcy Code. As stated ^ n 
Cournover v. Town of Lincoln, 790 F.2d 971, 974 (5th Cir. 1986): 
[Ujnder the new Code it is the district court, not the 
bankruptcy court which has exclusive jurisdiction of all the 
property of the debtor wherever located. 28 U.S.C § 1334(d). 
* * * Vesting exclusive jurisdiction of the bankrupt's property 
in the district court does not bar state court proceedings. At 
the most, there may be a stay of such proceedings. 
The premise that this action is a collateral attack on the bankruptcy court's order 
approving the sale of the Larsen interest is false. Appellants have in no way at any time 
in this case challenged "the validity of a trustee's auction" or made any "challenge to the 
bankruptcy court's order approving the trustee's auction sale".2 
It is undisputed that Larsen's share in Westland II was wholly owned by him and 
unencumbered and that it became an asset of the bankruptcy estate subject to the 
exclusive control of the bankruptcy court. Appellants have never asserted that the 
bankruptcy court order approving the trustee's auction was improper. Nor do appellants 
have any interest in doing so, because they want the sale to proceed, but in compliance 
with the partnership agreement. This suit does not assert any claim that the trustee did not 
have exclusive right to sell the estate asset, nor is there any claim that the auction 
conducted by the trustee was improper. 
The claim asserted by appellants in this case arose at that precise moment when, 
having conducted the auction approved by the bankruptcy court, the trustee then 
2
 Appellee's Brief, p. 14. 
7 
transferred the Larsen interest by assigning the interest to Maero in breach of the 
requirements of the partnership agreement. By doing so the trustee cut off the contract 
right of the general partner to acquire the interest on the same terms. Done properly, the 
sale is still concluded, and there is no impact on the estate or the estate creditors, since the 
estate receives the same amount regardless. The status of the matter is that the sale has 
yet to be properly completed.3 
There is nothing in the bankruptcy court's order approving the auction that 
authorized the trustee to sell the asset free of the contract restrictions. There is no order 
of the bankruptcy court subsequent to the trustee's auction specifically approving the sale 
to Maero.4 There is thus no claim being made by appellants that is in direct conflict with 
any bankruptcy court order. 
The claim that the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction of this case is contrary 
to federal law. The action here is between two private litigants, applying exclusively non-
bankruptcy law principles, to determine if Maero received anything from the bankruptcy 
trustee. The trustee is not a party, there is no financial impact upon the bankruptcy estate, 
and the only bankruptcy law involved is the rule discussed in Appellants' Brief (pp. 23-
26), and unchallenged in Maero's brief, that with respect to the Larsen Westland II 
3
 If the transfer to Maero is declared invalid, that will provide the basis for a 
motion in federal bankruptcy court to briefly reopen the bankruptcy proceeding so that the 
interest can be transferred properly and then closed. That is an administrative procedure 
allowed under the Bankruptcy Rules that can be accomplished easily when and if the 
claims of Maero have been dispensed with. 
4
 Defendants' Exhibit 3, entries after #416, pp. 1-26. 
8 
interest, the trustee stood in the shoes of Larsen and was obligated to comply with the 
provisions of the partnership agreement the same as Larsen himself would have had to if 
there had been no bankruptcy. 
The jurisdiction of the federal courts in bankruptcy proceedings is governed 
exclusively by 28 U.S.C. §1334, which is reproduced in Addendum A to this reply brief. 
Maero makes no reference to this controlling statute. Whether a bankruptcy matter is 
"core", or not, as alluded to in Maero's brief, has nothing whatever to do with a 
bankruptcy court's jurisdiction, but deals only with what matters a bankruptcy court can 
determine itself under the limited scope of its delegated powers. 
"The classification of a proceeding as core or noncore [under 
Section 157(b)(2)(B)] does not determine the jurisdiction of a 
bankruptcy court, but instead relates to a determination of 
whether the court may enter a final order or judgment or 
whether it may only issue findings of fact and conclusions of 
law upon which the district court enters a final order upon a 
de novo review." In re Wefco, Inc., 97 B.R. 749, 19 Bankr. 
Ct. Dec. (CRR) 423 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).5 
Under 28 U.S.C. §1334 federal district courts are given exclusive jurisdiction over 
the actual bankruptcy proceeding itself in § 1334(a), and over property of the debtor in 
§ 1334(e), but the "district courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of 
all civil proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to cases under 
title 11." (28 U.S.C. § 1334(b), emphasis added). Congress thus provided expressly for 
concurrent federal and state jurisdiction of civil suits arising under the bankruptcy code 
5
 In re Leslie Fay Companies, Inc., 224 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2000), cited in Norton 
Bankruptcy Law and Practice 3d, p. 4-124. 
9 
(i.e., involving a provision of the bankruptcy code), or arising in the bankruptcy case, or 
in suits in state courts or adversary proceedings in bankruptcy court "related to" a 
bankruptcy case. 
"Various bankruptcy proceedings, both core and noncore, 
may be commenced either in bankruptcy court or 
nonbankrutpcy courts because of their concurrent 
jurisdiction."6 
Congress even went a step further by providing rules or guidelines in § 1334(c) and (d) 
when federal courts having jurisdiction may or must abstain from exercising jurisdiction 
in deference to state jurisdiction. 
Since this case arose under state contract law, and clearly did not arise "in" the 
bankruptcy proceeding, it falls if at all in that broad category of actions "related to" a 
bankruptcy "case", or at least did so when the Larsen bankruptcy was still pending. The 
jurisdictional roles between the federal courts and state courts in such cases normally play 
out in motions to remove a state action to bankruptcy court (one of the bankruptcy cases 
cited by Maero, discussed below), motions in adversary proceedings filed in bankruptcy 
court challenging federal jurisdiction or requesting the federal court to abstain from 
exercising jurisdiction, or motions in bankruptcy court to remand a civil action back to 
state court that had been previously removed to federal court.7 
6
 Norton, Bankruptcy Law and Practice 3rd, §4.48, p. 4-174 (footnote omitted). 
See also In re W.S.F. World Sports Fans. LLC, 37 B.R. 786 (Bkrtcy.D.N.M 2007), 
(Bankruptcy court has non-exclusive jurisdiction over both core civil proceedings and 
non-core civil proceedings related to a case under title 11). 
7
 See for example In re Green, discussed more fully in footnote 8 infra. 
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The Larsen bankruptcy has been closed for years, so this case is no longer related 
to any "case under title 11" that this action could be filed in or removed to. Hence, there 
is no federal jurisdiction of this case at all under § 1334(b), and Maero's claim of 
exclusive jurisdiction is wholly without foundation.8 
While the Larsen bankruptcy case was still pending, this action could have been 
brought in either state or federal court. Thus, if Maero had wanted to invoke federal court 
jurisdiction, he could have filed in federal court in the first instance. Of course, we 
maintain that Maero had no interest in bringing this case as an adversary proceeding in 
bankruptcy court, because that might have delayed the closing of the estate and afforded 
the trustee an opportunity to correct the mistake, which would have left Maero with 
nothing. That is the only plausible explanation why Maero waited almost three years until 
the Larsen bankruptcy was nearly over before coming forward and claiming that he was 
entitled to the Larsen interest. Maero then took no action to move this case forward until 
after the bankruptcy case was closed, as is obvious from the record. 
There are other reasons why a bankruptcy court might not have jurisdiction of 
this case or might abstain from asserting jurisdiction even if the Larsen bankruptcy was 
8
 See Zerand-Bernal Group. Inc. v. Cox. 23 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 1985) wherein a 
postconfirmation injunction proceeding was held to be neither "related to," nor one that 
"arose in" the bankruptcy case, nor "arose under" the bankruptcy code, concluding that 
jurisdiction was lacking because the bankruptcy case was over and the post confirmation 
dispute did not involve the debtor. Another example is Peabody Landscape Const. Inc. v. 
Schottenstein, S.D.Ohio, 2007 WL 2059079 
11 
still pending,9 but suffice it so say for this appeal that the existence or lack thereof of 
federal concurrent jurisdiction has no effect whatever upon this court's jurisdiction. 
The cases cited in support of the claim that the federal courts have "exclusive 
jurisdiction" of this matter all deal with widely dissimilar facts and do not support 
Maero's theory: 
(a) In re Allnutt10 does not involve a jurisdictional dispute at all. It is a 
removal case only, wherein the bankruptcy court finds that it has jurisdiction. There is no 
holding that the federal court had exclusive jurisdiction or that state court from which the 
action was removed did not have jurisdiction. 
(b) Warner v. DMG Color Inc.11 was apparently chosen for the "collateral 
attack" language used by the Supreme Court rather than any precedential value it may 
have. It is actually a counter example because in that case the Utah Supreme Court 
exercised jurisdiction. 
9
 See for example In re Green, City of Joliet v. Bank One, Chicago, 210 B.R. 556 
(Illinois, 1997), wherein state court action on a bank letter of credit guaranteed by the 
bankruptcy debtor was removed by the bank to bankruptcy court, but then remanded to 
the state court by the bankruptcy court for lack of jurisdiction because the suit did not 
involve the debtor and both parties to the suit had filed claims against the estate such that 
the "effect on the estate will be the same regardless of who wins this action." 210 B.R. at 
559. Similarly in this case, the action was not brought against the trustee, and the estate 
has been paid, and would have been paid the same whether it received the money from 
Maero or Bunker. 
10
 220 B.R. 871 (Bankr.D.Md 1998). 
11
 2000UT102,20P.3d868. 
12 
(c) In re Bragg12 is an unreported opinion that is the only authority cited 
that holds that the federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction, but only in the context of a 
direct conflict between the bankruptcy court and a state court over what percentage 
interest the debtor wife had in a house held in joint tenancy with her non-debtor husband. 
The district court clearly had concurrent jurisdiction, but the court's holding of exclusive 
jurisdiction is questionable.13 The jurisdictional conflict arose because the bankruptcy 
court approved the sale of the wife's interest in the house as a 50% interest, whereas a 
state divorce court later found that the debtor wife's interest was only 35%. The 
bankruptcy court's opinion rested on two grounds in addition to jurisdiction, including 
that the husband's equity interest in the house different from 50% was avoidable by the 
trustee as a hypothetical lien creditor, and the husband had been present through counsel 
at the hearing where the interest of the wife was determined and had an obligation to 
speak up if he contested the bankruptcy court's determination. In any event the case 
clearly has no application here, since there is no dispute that the bankruptcy estate owned 
all of the interest in Larsen's Westland II share. 
12
 Unreported, contained only at 2000 WL 33710886 (Bankr.D.S.C. 2000). 
13
 It is addressed in the last part of the opinion and is unsupported by any 
authority. It is squarely in conflict with § 1334(b) and is, for example, in conflict with the 
Cournoyer decision of the fifth circuit noted above. While the federal district courts have 
exclusive jurisdiction over bankruptcy estate property, the determination of what property 
is owned by the debtor is a question of state law that is actionable in either state or federal 
court under 28 U.S.C. §1334. 
13 
2. Section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code has no application to this 
proceeding. (This addresses Point II of Maero's brief). This new claim is spurious 
because this case does not involve an appeal of the bankruptcy court order approving the 
sale of the Larsen interest. Appellants had no grounds to object to such order or to lodge 
an appeal thereof, nor do they have any interest in doing so, as previously argued. 
3. The right of first refusal provisions of the partnership agreement were 
not rendered ineffectual during the winding up. (This addresses Point III.B. of 
Appellee's Brief). Maero seeks to score a win even if the trial court is reversed by 
claiming that the dissolution of Westland II abrogates the partnership agreement even if 
the partnership continues in existence while winding up. Maero first argues that 
appellants have failed to cite any support for the common sense idea that the partnership 
agreement continues to be binding on the partners during dissolution and winding up, as 
if the partnership could continue in existence but not the partnership agreement—leaving 
it in some sort of undefined partnership limbo. Maero of course fails to cite any contrary 
authority. 
Maero focuses his argument on the first right of refusal provisions of the contract, 
claiming that at least these provisions became ineffective when Westland II was 
dissolved. This new theory rests on several claims: first on the idea that since dissolution 
effectively restricts the general partner from exercising some of the powers granted to 
him under the partnership agreement, dissolution likewise abrogates his right of first 
14 
refusal rights, citing Parduhn v. Bennett;14 second- that where "a partnership has been 
dissolved, and ongoing business ceases, the justification for a transfer restriction is no 
longer present", citing no authority; third, that the activity of transferring partnership 
interests "are not part of the winding-up activities that should occur" during liquidation, 
citing no authority; and finally, that the right of first refusal provisions do not specifically 
state that section 18 will continue to be effective during dissolution, citing no authority. 
The Parduhn case does not support Maero's claim. At issue there was whether a 
buy-sell agreement (separate from the partnership agreement) to buy out the interest of a 
deceased partner to carry on their service station business was still effective after the 
partners, while still alive, had sold the entire business. The holding was that the buy-sell 
agreement did not survive the sale of the business due to conduct of the parties 
inconsistent with its continued existence and the dissolution of the partnership caused by 
the sale prior to the death of the deceased ex-partner. 
Due to the conditions of the real estate market, winding up Westland IPs affairs 
took several years. During that time a number of proper transfers of partnership interests 
and changes in partner status are reflected in the public records of the partnership.15 
There is rvo weed for any "justification" for the contract restrictions on the sale of 
partnership interests beyond the fact that the partners agreed on the restrictions. But there 
are many reasons such restrictions are commonplace, including federal income tax 
14
 2002 UT 93, 61 P.3d 982 (2002). 
15
 Defendants' Exhibit 1, pp. 49-71. 
15 
considerations, federal and state securities law implications if shares are freely 
transferable, and the desire to keep the shares restricted so that the general partner doesn't 
end up having to deal with unknown parties. The last point is perhaps best illustrated by 
the very first letter Maero sent to Bunker, which is hostile in tone and wherein he 
deliberately refuses to recognize Bunker as the general partner of Westland II, referring to 
him only as "a representative" of the partnership.16 
Regarding the argument that the right of first refusal provisions do not specifically 
state that they are to remain effective during winding up, the same could be said for all 
other provisions of the partnership agreement. This is thus reductio ad absurdurn. 
Maero's theory is completely without support in the law and in any intent of the 
partners ascertainable from the partnership agreement. 
4. AH evidence in this record establishes Bunker as the general partner of 
Westland II, and any theories of Maero based on a claim that Bunker is not the 
general partner is Westland II are inappropriate and spurious. (This addresses Point 
IV.A. of Maero's brief). Maero claims Bunker was not the general partner of Westland II 
to support the new theory that if there was no general partner, then the right of first 
refusal provisions didn't apply to the trustee. The argument is both a non-sequitur and 
based on facts not in evidence and or at issue before the district court or this court. 
Maero cites no authority for the proposition that a vacancy in the general partner 
position of Westland II would have relieved the trustee of the contract restrictions. We 
16
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submit that the limited partner interests could not then be sold until a general partner was 
in place. This is, however, purely academic, because the trustee had already recognized 
Bunker as the general partner and would have discharged her contract responsibilities if 
she had sent notice to him. 
Bunker has appeared of record as the sole general partner of Westland II since 
1988.17 During that time no other elections were held and no partner of the partnership 
ever objected to Bunker serving as general partner.18 When the Larsen trustee sued 
Westland II in 1989 concerning the status of the Larsen interest, she served Bunker as 
general partner and settled the matter with Bunker.19 The funds being contested in this 
action are the result of Bunker's efforts that included settlements, contracts and deeds 
signed by Bunker as general partner. 
Bunker was named and served as a party defendant by Maero in this action. There 
was no claim asserted in the complaint or in Maero's trial brief that Bunker was not the 
legitimate general partner of Westland II. Nor would Maero have had standing to assert 
such a claim. Bunker's status as general partner was not a matter of discovery or pre-
trial motions. No such claim was raised during trial. Only briefly in closing argument 
was the issue ever mentioned, and the matter was not considered by the trial court. The 
claim that Bunker is not the general partner of Westland II therefore has no basis in fact 
17
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19
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in the record before this court and is not a contested issue for decision in this action. 
Hence, any theory advanced by Maero that rests on the unsupported claim that 
Bunker is not the general partner of Westland II is without merit. The argument is 
moreover a red herring because it is based on the fact that Bunker was not elected as 
general partner by "all" of the limited partners. That is only a requirement to avoid 
dissolution of the partnership, not the election of a substitute general partner during 
liquidation, which only required a majority vote under paragraph 24.1 of the partnership 
agreement. 
5. The theory that the restrictions in the partnership agreement did 
not apply to the trustee because she was not a substitute limited partner is without 
merit because the trustee was not a "purchaser" of the interest and the trustee had 
no more rights than Larsen. (This addresses section IV.B. of Appellee's Brief). 
Maero argues that under paragraph 18.2 of the partnership agreement, no person who 
"purchases" an interest in the partnership has a right to become a substitute limited 
partner until admitted by the general partner; and because the right of first refusal 
provisions of paragraph 18 apply to a "limited partner" and the trustee was not admitted 
as a substitute limited partner, the trustee was not bound by transfer restrictions. This 
theory fails for two reasons. 
The theory is logically baseless because the trustee was not a "purchaser" of the 
Larsen interest. The bankruptcy estate, not the trustee, became vested with the interest 
by operation of law under 11 U.S.C. §541(a). Second, Maero admits that the trustee 
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"stepped into Larsen's shoes" regarding the Westland II interest, but then contradicts that 
admission by claiming that the trustee had greater powers than Larsen had himself to 
transfer the asset. This is contrary to the authorities cited by appellants in their brief, 
which Maero has not contested. The trustee was subject to the restrictions because 
Larsen would have been bound by them if there had been no bankruptcy. It is irrelevant 
whether the trustee's status was that of a limited partner or not. 
There are many cases holding that a trustee or debtor in possession is bound by 
contract and other restrictions on transfer, in addition to those authorities cited in 
Appellant's Brief. See for example In re Baquet 61 B.R. 495, 500 (D. Montana 
1986)(enforcing restrictions on the sale of closely held shares of common stock that 
required the stock to offered first to other shareholders and then the corporation for $7 per 
share before they could be offered to the public: "Reported decisions indicate a broad 
spectrum of sales by trustees in Chapter 7 cases or debtor's in possession where 
restrictions on sale are imposed.") 
The argument is moot in any event, since the trustee was recognized as a substitute 
limited partner in Westland II by Bunker, as evidenced by filings with the state. See 
Defendants Exhibit 1, pp. 56 ff. 
6. Maero presents nothing new with respect to the spurious claim that the 
trustee's notice of auction substantially complied with the right of first refusal 
provisions of the partnership agreement; there is no response to Appellant's Brief, 
pp. 27-32. This, the most consistently asserted claim in the district court, has now taken 
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last place in Maero's list of theories. Maero in his brief argues nothing new, and provides 
no response to the analysis in Appellant's Brief, pp. 27-32. The claim is patently 
spurious, even if appellants had received the trustee's notice, which they didn't. 
CONCLUSION 
Maero asserts no compelling reasons why the trial court should not be reversed and 
the partnership agreement should not be enforced. The trial court's judgment should be 
reversed and the case should be remanded to the trial court with instructions to enter 
judgment invalidating the Larsen trustee's assignment to Maero. 
Respectfully submitted this 18th day of March, 2009. 
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Addendum A 
TITLE 28 JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE 
PART IV-JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
CHAPTER 85-DISTRICT COURTS; JURISDICTION 
§ 1334. Bankruptcy cases and proceedings 
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the district courts shall have 
original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11. 
(b) Except as provided in subsection (e)(2), and notwithstanding any Act of Congress that 
confers exclusive jurisdiction on a court or courts other than the district courts, the district 
courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising 
under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11. 
(c) (1) Except with respect to a case under chapter 15 of title 11, nothing in this section 
prevents a district court in the interest of justice, or in the interest of comity with State 
courts or respect for State law, from abstaining from hearing a particular proceeding 
arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11. 
(2) Upon timely motion of a party in a proceeding based upon a State law claim or 
State law cause of action, related to a case under title 11 but not arising under title 11 or 
arising in a case under title 11, with respect to which an action could not have been 
commenced in a court of the United States absent jurisdiction under this section, the 
district court shall abstain from hearing such proceeding if an action is commenced, and 
can be timely adjudicated, in a State forum of appropriate jurisdiction. 
(d) Any decision to abstain or not to abstain made under subsection (c) (other than a 
decision not to abstain in a proceeding described in subsection (c)(2)) is not reviewable 
by appeal or otherwise by the court of appeals under [section 158(d)] subsection (e) or (f) 
of section 158, 1291, or 1292 of this title or by the Supreme Court of the United States 
under section 1254 of this title. Subsection (c) and this subsection shall not be construed 
to limit the applicability of the stay provided for by section 362 of title 11, United States 
Code, as such section applies to an action affecting the property of the estate in 
bankruptcy. 
(e) The district court in which a case under title 11 is commenced or is pending shall have 
exclusive jurisdiction— 
(1) of all the property, wherever located, of the debtor as of the date of commencement 
of such case, and of property of the estate; and 
(2) over all claims or causes of action that involve construction of section 327 of title 
11, United States Code, or rules relating to disclosure requirements under section 327. 
